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Agents intentionality, capabilities and the performance of Systems of 
Innovation 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The historical emergence of the so-called knowledge-based economies (Cooke, 2001) 
has favored the emergence of analytical frameworks that classify and analyze the 
empirical evidence linked to the conceptual elements of the said knowledge economies. 
A starting point for this kind of theoretical research is the recognition and understanding 
of the complex processes that underlie the characteristic innovation processes of 
knowledge-based economies. These include knowledge-creation, diffusion and 
organization processes. One very important issue is the role these processes play in 
relation to the elements, processes and dynamical links that configure the innovation 
processes.  
It is apparent that different patterns of innovation exist across nations, regions, 
sectors and technologies. This is why some authors consider that the relevant level of 
analysis for innovation processes is the national (Freeman, 1987, 2002, Nelson, 1993, 
Lundvall, 1992), the sectoral (Malerba, 2002, 2004), or regional level (Cooke et al., 
1997). In any case, comparisons among agents, sources of novelty, institutions, and 
innovation policies in different nations, sectors or technologies reveal significant 
differences, which suggests that the sources of novelties and their role of dynamical 
transformation across the economy is much more diverse and thus requires a specific 
explanation (Mowery and Nelson, 1999). However, these kinds of approaches are not 
free from criticism; one of such criticisms assesses that the innovation systems approach 
is at best heuristic, rather than theory (Edquist, 2005, p. 186).1  
This paper departs from an abstract definition of a system as a set of constitutive 
elements (objects as knowledge, agents, institutions, beliefs, goals, etc.) and the 
connections among them serving a common purpose. This structure and its evolution 
should support the analytical description of dynamic phenomena such as innovation 
processes.  
                                            
1 Edquist (2005) points out that the main weakness of the systems of innovation approach is that, despite 
its usefulness for describing sector performance, it is ‘over-theorized’ or ‘sub-theorized’ and is thus not 
sufficiently clear on its theoretical basis and epistemological status.  
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We are interested on how and why an economic system evolves, which are the 
causes of such evolution and, therefore, of the differences across systems. We find out 
that SIs differ substantially because there are specific causes at work, apart from the 
differences in the underlying technologies, institutions, etc. Several of these ‘other 
causes’ appear in a diffuse way throughout the literature, despite their great importance 
for explaining a system’s performance. In particular, we refer to the goal dynamics and 
intentionality of the agents interacting within a system.  
Thus, a key issue for understanding evolutionary processes is the way dynamic 
connections are formed. The characteristic evolutionary processes of selection and 
retention operate on this basis (Foster and Metcalfe, 2001). The question is how and 
which connections activate within an economic system in general, and in an SI in 
particular. We argue that self-transformation processes result from changes in agents’ 
knowledge as a consequence of learning and acquisition of (new) evolving capabilities 
and that these processes are triggered, among other causes, by the dynamics of 
generation and the hierarchical change of agents’ goals as linked to agents’ 
intentionality. To accommodate this idea, we propose the analytical concept of an 
agent’s action plan that would also allow for examination of the evolutionary efficiency 
of an SI.  
The underlying thesis in this paper is that we assume that agent intentionality is 
a necessary condition for a substantive explanation of the dynamism of any socio-
economic system. The argument is consistent with the role that the categories of 
intentionality, such as belief, goal, intention, collective intentionality, etc., are part of 
cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence and social philosophy, etc. in the explanation 
of individual and collective behavior and the emergence of institutions (Grosz and 
Hunsberger, 2006, Metzinger and Gallese, 2003, Baldwin and Baird, 2001). If we are 
right, the paper would contribute to the microfoundation of SI on agent action (or 
agency), which result in individual and organizational evolving capabilities, and their 
consequences for economic change (Loasby, 2008, Felin and Foss, 2006, 2009).  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 points out a theoretical foundation 
of system that focuses on the concept of connections and that makes them the prime 
variables; section 3 poses the microfoundation of dynamism of SI, especially how 
connections are established among elements within a system and how agents’ 
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capabilities evolve; section 4 explores the implications of agents’ capabilities and 
intentionality for the resulting performance of an SI. In this section, we also refer to the 
‘products’ of innovation processes (the structure of an SI) and propose an evolutionary 
efficiency criterion for the dynamic performance of a complex process. Section 5 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Systems, knowledge and connections  
 
Analytically, a system is explained by both its constituent elements and the connections 
by which they are related in order to accomplish a common purpose innovative in the 
case of SIs. In a dynamic analysis, the fundamental issues are that connections are 
continually changing, which “makes connections the prime variables” (Potts, 2000, p. 
5), and that the recombinant process of connections may generate novelties (Loasby, 
2001). Knowledge itself is an example of association among elements: which the 
specific elements are and how they are connected is knowledge itself - knowledge may 
be considered as a structure, a system of connections that is also changing.  
A feature of any complex evolving system is modularity (Simon, 1969). Once a 
system emerges (as a complex entity) it can become an element (or subsystem) of a 
higher-level system. For instance, an innovative organization or firm is a complex 
system integrated within an SI which, at the same time, is part of a higher order 
economic system, etc. Thus, every system is built with elements that may be lower-level 
systems themselves. ‘System’ is a ubiquitous concept.  
As has been said, knowledge is a system itself; and the structures of the human 
brain by which it is supported also constitute a system (Fuster, 2003, see also Dopfer, 
2005, p. 24). At the same time, they are parts of a human body, etc. From another point 
of view, knowledge is embodied in organizations and firms, sectors, etc. that are higher-
level systems. The growth of knowledge consists of the accumulation of connections 
between the internal elements of a system, and between these elements and others 
belonging to higher or lower ranks. The economic agent itself is a system. Following 
Earl (2003), the economic agent is completely reconstructed when all of its internal and 
external operational connections have been made completely explicit. Moreover, 
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economic agents are continuously establishing (and removing) connections. We refer to 
such a process as learning.  
The connections that constitute agent knowledge, whatever its content and 
structure, are the basis of their economic and social action. Agents make use of their 
acquired knowledge to draw up theories (Nelson, 2008a) on how the diverse elements 
that constitute the physical-natural, technological and social systems within which they 
deploy their action are causally connected. These theories have a conjectural value 
(Popper, 1972) and they are not necessarily true in that they have not been scientifically 
contrasted. These theories are models or frameworks that enable agents to anticipate (or 
form expectations about) the consequences of their actions in a context of uncertainty, 
thus defining the set of feasible events and weights (‘probability’) attached to them by 
agents. These future courses of action have to be necessarily imagined and deemed 
possible (Loasby, 1996) since they affect the agents’ actions. Models provide 
frameworks and procedures which, insofar as they are of common use, may be defined 
as institutions.2  
The connections that configure these frames or structures for action are 
necessarily incomplete.33 In a context of true uncertainty, it is impossible for agents to 
know all the feasible links between the elements (usually means, but also goals of 
action) that constitute a system in the present and future.  
Learning consists of testing and (eventually) retaining new connections that 
prove to be useful for agents to reach their goals; in this sense we may speak of driven 
learning processes. As a consequence, agents deploy bounded rationality which 
“connote the reasoning and learning abilities of an agent who has a goal to achieve and, 
on the one hand, an at least partially formed theory about how to achieve it (this is the 
‘rationality’ part of the concept), and on the other hand, that the agent’s theory is likely 
somewhat crude and perhaps even a bad guide for action, and that success is far from 
assured (this is the meaning of the ‘bounded’ qualification to rationality)” (Nelson, 
2008a, p. 78). Both aspects of the concept seem necessary to capture what we know 
about human and organizational problem-solving in a variety of different arenas. This 
                                            
2 As Loasby has pointed out, the study of economic processes is also the study of institutions (Loasby, 
1999, p. 13). 
3 An example of a complete system is that of the Walrasian general equilibrium theory. In this kind of 
system there is no room for learning or for true dynamics. A ‘paradox’ underlies this argument: 
knowledge always implies lack of knowledge (Allen, 2004, p. 85). 
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approach is also compatible with the emergence of novelty and with the growth of 
knowledge; i.e. with the conditions of possibility of true learning processes (Witt, 
2009).  
To summarize, we may assess that knowledge is connections, structure is 
connections and dynamics consists of changes in connections. Taking for granted this 
approach, important questions arise: how does a system evolve towards adjacent states? 
Why is it able to pass from one state to another? How does knowledge grow? And, how 
does it coordinate efficiently? The organization of knowledge, its growth/evolution and 
its eventual efficient coordination are all key issues for understanding the configuration 
and the pattern of innovation of a SI.  
 
3. Action plans, knowledge and agents’ goals  
 
For evolutionary economics, social and economic systems are considered as systems 
liable to continuous change: evolution is the result of the self-transformation of systems 
over time (Witt, 2003b, pp. 12-13). Evolution is seen as the process or set of processes 
that combine the generation of novelties with the selective retention of some of these 
novelties (Loasby, 2001, Dopfer and Potts, 2008), following the well-known 
evolutionary three-phase schema: generation-selection/adoption-retention of variety 
(Foster and Metcalfe, 2001). Moreover, evolving systems are characterized by 
continuous endogenous change induced by the generation of novelties and subject to 
selection processes that operate on self-organized processes (Kauffman, 1995).  
However, what changes? What, if any, is the unit of selection in such selection-
retention processes? What about the causal explanation of renewed variety? These are 
controversial issues. For some authors, the unit of selection is routines (Becker, 2004); 
for North (2005) and Hodgson (1993), it is institutions; for Boulding (1981), Hayek 
(1945, Hayek, 1952) and Loasby (1999), it is knowledge which evolves, to the extent 
that they identify the basic economic problem with that of the social organization of 
knowledge; for others, it is capabilities (Dosi et al., 2000), etc. Finally, there are those 
who, like Dopfer and Potts (2008), on a more abstract level, consider that it is rules or it 
is connections between the elements of a system that change. 
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In order to understand the microfoundation of an SI, we should carefully 
differentiate the types of connections that are established between the elements in a 
system. In particular, between the different kinds of elements that are connected: 
means/actions and goals/objectives, which determine the direction of connections.  
Economic dynamics is sustained by agents’ activities. And to the extent that 
these activities are rational, they are planned activities –not certainly in the sense that 
they obey a central plan, but in the sense that they are planned by agents themselves. 
Thus economic dynamics may be understood in a complementary way to that 
previously exposed as the process of generation, adoption and an attempted interactive 
deployment of the agents’ action plans and the resulting ‘products’ (Encinar and 
Muñoz, 2006). Agents’ action plans are the result of a key operation that consists of 
agents allocating means/actions projectively in order to reach the goals/ends/objectives 
they pursue (Rubio de Urquía, 2005). In other words, at each instant of time, an action 
plan may be interpreted as a template or ‘guide’ for action that projectively connects 
elements of a different nature: something the agent wants to achieve (goals) with the 
actions and means the agent ‘knows’ afford him/her success.  
Agents choose their goals of action on the basis of a myriad of psychological, 
social, and cultural factors, motives (Barnard, 1938), beliefs (Metcalfe, 2004), etc. 
Agents constitute their action plans using their imagination (Loasby, 2007), taking into 
account that the goals they pursue are located in an imagined future (Lachmann, 1994 
[1978]). Thus, it could be said without exaggeration that agents ‘invent’ the future on 
which they focus their actions. This idea is valid whether we consider objectives in the 
short, mid or long term. The opportunities for acting in a specific way (entrepreneurial 
action, for instance) are not hidden somewhere in reality, waiting to be discovered by 
entrepreneurs or visionaries, but they ‘emerge’ initially in the mind of agents regardless 
of the fact that at some time in the future they may be embodied in a written document 
or an organizational form, etc.4  
The agent’s set of actions and goals linked projectively by means of an action 
plan may contain different kinds of elements: material or immaterial elements, localized 
at different moments in time (obviously not all at the same time); with a monetary price 
(in official currency) or without a monetary price (a subjective level of satisfaction of a 
                                            
4 It is important to distinguish between this use of projective imagination and the Austrian School’s 
traditional approach to ‘entrepreneurship’, which is based on the concept of ‘discovery’ (Kirzner, 1992). 
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need), etc. Action plans are an analytical open representation of agents’ projective 
action, in which actions and goals are not given, but rather produced by the agents 
themselves. These analytical constructions accommodate any kind of action plan, such 
as a planned trip, a business plan, a strategic plan (Day, 2008, pp. 264-265), with 
structures of hierarchical dependence between goals and with as many analytical 
periods of time as necessary. Moreover, these analytical structures may be used to 
represent how agents’ action plans configure the economic dynamics of a society when 
they are deployed interactively.  
Knowledge stands as cognitive networks in the human brain; routines; habits and 
patterns of behavior, cognitive, social and technological rules; institutions; 
organizations, etc. Knowledge is also the foundation of capabilities. Evolutionary 
economics usually describes the evolution of an economy as a consequence of the 
growth of knowledge. However, the locus of the goals agents pursue (as well as their 
internal dynamics of evolution, which alter their hierarchical interdependence and 
contents) and their intentionality as elements that encourage action and knowledge, 
although recognized in modern neuroscience (Fuster, 2008) is beyond the scope of 
economics or at least remain problematic. However, the goals and intentionality of 
agents play an essential role in explaining the emergence of novelties and evolving 
capabilities (Langlois, 2006, Cañibano et al., 2006), institutions (Nelson, 2008b, p. 7) 
and learning processes (Dosi et al., 2000, pp. 2-4).  
In general, evolutionary economics proceeds in its models and theories as if the 
goals pursued by agents were given. Action plans should articulate the best way to 
match (given a set of resources and/or of possible actions) those goals. Until recently 
the analysis of the role played by agents’ intentionality and the goals they pursued in the 
development of new capabilities, new patterns of behavior, etc. has been postponed.5 
However, a true dynamic theory should consider the real fact that new goals of action 
may emerge, that the hierarchical ordering of goals may change, that goals reached now 
(or never) may be removed from or replaced in agents’ plans, etc. All these changes 
                                            
5 Even so, “intentionality in learning processes is a key, but relatively unexplored, dimension of capability 
building in strategic tasks” (Zollo, 2008). However, the role of purposes is not strange to the literature of 
technical innovation. For example, (Arthur, 2007, p. 276) defines technology in terms of human purposes: 
“I will define a technology ... quite simply as a means to fulfil a human purpose. The purpose may be 
explicit...; or it may be hazy, multiple, and changing... But whether its purpose is well defined or not, a 
technology is a means to carrying out a purpose.” North (2005) also devotes chapter (#4) to these issues.  
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involve learning processes, as well as the emergence of completely new actions that 
cannot be explained only by means of knowledge acquisition. They are special 
connections that are established between new goals and means/actions.  
In our approach, intentionality, which can be defined technically as “that feature 
of representations by which they are about something or directed at something” (Searle, 
1995, p. 7n. Italics in the original), is linked to goals, and it activates the development of 
capabilities, the testing of new connections within a system, and, therefore, the 
generation of new knowledge (learning). Aligning, coordinating, reordering and even 
inventing new goals are activities that generate novelty and are therefore sources of true 
dynamism in economic processes.6 For example, the child’s vague idea of becoming a 
doctor may allow him to discover an ‘innate capacity’ (or vocation); this would lead 
him to want to ‘become a professional doctor’ (a new goal), and thus to study medicine 
at university, which finally enables him to work in the profession.  
Goals of action evolve over time, inducing changes in agents’ capabilities, which 
may result in the formulation of renewed goals and intentions and, therefore, in the 
development of renewed capabilities. Agents differ in knowledge and capabilities, but 
also in the goals they pursue and in the way they produce such goals. Agents are 
heterogeneous because they also conceive different goals and/or different hierarchies of 
goals and, consequently, they develop different capabilities, deploying interactive 
learning processes to carry out their plans. The result is that agents introduce a wide 
variety of changes in their (physical and social) environment by means of their actions, 
thus altering the spaces of action (and the plans) of other agents. The emergence of new 
intentions linked to the conception of new goals renews agents’ capabilities. Therefore, 
evolving capabilities open up new possibilities for action that allow the conception of 
new goals, generating continuous feedback between capabilities and intentions.  
Of course, not all changes in society are the result of intended actions. In fact, 
not all actions carried out by agents are intended. Furthermore, not all the consequences 
of actions are intended or even expected. The consequences of actions may be and 
usually are very different from what agents pursue. Interaction in complex situations, 
                                            
6 It is important to point out the social character of intentionality: intentionality exists not only in private 
mental space, but also in functional space with others. Moreover, intentionality is a functional mechanism 
for social cognition linked to understanding means and ends in attaining goals. A good survey on these 
issues is Malle et al. (eds.) (2001).  
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un-knowledge, etc. may lead to completely unexpected results. Moreover, it has been 
said that evolution is a ‘blind’ process (Vanberg, 2006) because new properties and 
unintended consequences emerge within it (Popper, 1948). Nevertheless, human action, 
qua rational, within human constraints, is intended action: there must be goals (reasons) 
for acting (Mises, 1949).7 From the perspective of action plans, it is possible to analyze 
how agents’ cognitive dynamics might, for example, imply the introduction of new 
(projected) actions or means in agents’ plans and the discovery (invention) of new 
relationships between actions and goals as a consequence of novelties in the agents’ 
projective space of goals, thus implying a change in the connections between elements 
within a system. Consequently, although not all actions are intended and not all 
novelties are a consequence or the pursuit of particular goals, the evolution of agents’ 
goals and intentions is a key explanatory factor because it triggers processes that 
establish and renew the connections within a system (Muñoz et al., 2011).  
 
4. Capabilities, intentionality and SI performance  
 
Actions such as producing, consuming, innovating, working and organizing, even 
choosing are conditioned by the goals designed and pursued by agents, goals and 
intentions that change continuously. The diversity and intensity of such changes in 
agents’ intentionality have substantial value as important factors for explaining socio-
economic self-transformation processes because they trigger search processes and the 
establishment of connections with adjacent states of the system, altering its topology 
and thus giving rise to new features that emerge within the system. Moreover, together 
with the means agents discover and ‘invent’ to reach them, these changing goals and 
intentions constitute the agents’ action plans that they (attempt to) deploy interactively. 
The deployment of driven learning processes is also capable of modulating institutions, 
configuring agent networks, changing standards, beliefs and agents’ habits, etc., as well 
                                            
7 “[I]n the discourse on prefrontal physiology, goal is of the essence. All cognitive functions of the lateral 
prefrontal cortex are determined, we might say ‘caused’, by goals. If there is a unique and characteristic 
feature of that part of the brain, it is its ability to structure the present in order to serve the future, by this 
apparently inverting the temporal direction of causality. Of course this inversion is not real in physical 
terms. It is only real in cognitive, thus neural, terms inasmuch as the representations of the goals for 
future actions antecede and cause those actions to occur through the agency of the prefrontal cortex. 
Teleology thus understood is at the basis of planning and decision-making, which are two of the major 
executive functions of the prefrontal cortex.” (Fuster, 2008, p. 4) 
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as giving rise to new evolving capabilities. Socio-economic reality is configured as a 
product of the co-evolution of these processes.  
 
4.1 Capabilities and intentionality  
Our argument enables the identification of the analytical locus of agents’ goals and 
intentionality as explanatory factors of the transformation of agents’ spaces of action 
and, therefore, of the systems they configure. The constitution of evolving capabilities 
by agents within an SI enables a “two-layers” analysis: on the one hand, the analysis of 
the constitutive elements of a system (elements and connections; that is, its structure). 
On the other hand, the analysis of how evolve the connections between those elements 
(its dynamics). The evolution of such connections is necessarily associated with the 
diversity and changes in the goals pursued by the agents that configure the SI.  
An economic system is not only a set of given elements and their static links, but 
also the potential dynamics of its connections via capabilities that emerge as knowledge 
grows. Thus, the emergence of evolving capabilities makes it possible to weave the 
network and explain it. Let us assume, for instance, an SI within the so called life 
sciences. Learning processes and scientific knowledge in life science allow for 
understanding the state and evolution of present research, implemented on the basis of 
the capabilities and skills of scientists. However, these learning processes and current 
knowledge also generate new research questions that spur the acquisition of new 
scientific knowledge. This new scientific knowledge, which would eventually give rise 
to new technological knowledge (which might be developed in firms, universities, 
research councils, etc.) is the starting point for the emergence and development of new 
capabilities within the scientific community itself and -if the conditions for accessibility 
and appropriateness so allow- the emergence of firms. The formation of new links 
between the system of science and firms would follow the implementation of new 
capabilities of the SI as a whole. Thus, the development process of capabilities as 
intended (driven) learning processes would configure the connections between several 
elements that constitute the system.  
This example tries to illustrate how and why the connections within a system 
may be continuously being established. As has been said, the emergence and 
development of capabilities are induced by intention, by agents’ tendency towards the 
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goals they set up. Goals are imagined realities, expectations, valued as more desirable 
states and towards which agents direct their action. Within a system, there is constant 
feedback between the intention and the evolutionary capabilities and this feedback 
explains the transformation of the system itself.  
The pursuit of a new goal may cause new capabilities and new patterns of 
behavior to be developed and learning processes to be activated, giving rise to new 
actions and interactions and new ways of doing things (process innovations) that may 
ultimately give rise to (by means of design, or as a result of selection) new institutions 
and/or modify the existing ones. It also may give rise to entrepreneurial experimentation 
processes (Bergek et al., 2008, p. 415), political entrepreneurship (Witt, 2003a, p. 82), 
etc.  
In other words, the pursuit of new goals allows the emergence of agents’ action 
plans with a new structure and contents. These new structures of connections between 
new means/actions and goals introduce a ‘renewed genetic material’ in the form of new 
action plans (new conjectures) which, when interacting, transforms the system 
connections network, giving rise to the emergence of novelties within the system and 
fuelling evolutionary processes. The appearance or hierarchical rearrangement of goals 
constitutes a source of transformation of the agents’ plans and of the subsystems that 
make up the economic system.  
In the example of life science, much of current research is based on skills, 
routines and capabilities already implemented by scientists and whose origin is linked to 
past goals they deliberately tried to reach. Why then does a system continue to develop 
new capabilities, as in the case of science, once certain given objectives have been 
reached? To answer this question, let us assume that the goal pursued by scientists 
within a specific field may be reached; in other words, it is technically attainable and the 
scientific community has been able to deploy the actions required (learning, adapting, 
developing capabilities, etc.) to attain its purpose. If the goal is reached, there would be 
no apparent reason for continuing the learning process, concluding the capability 
implementation process. However, experience shows that learning processes never 
come to a halt in a knowledge economy. As already mentioned, the reason lies in the 
continuous appearance of renewed goals of action.  
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For instance, in biomedicine it is not enough to discover a treatment for a serious 
illness: scientists are also interested in its mechanisms of propagation, its genetic base, 
etc. (Consoli and Ramlogan, 2008). The conception of new goals activates behaviors 
and actions by means of intention and will, aimed at the pursuit of that goal. This 
process generates new knowledge by transforming agents’ capabilities.  
To summarize, renewed or improved capabilities reduce the gap between the 
goals that the agents intend to achieve and the real outcome of their actions. The 
capability building process may help reduce this gap. Accordingly, intention activates a 
capability-development process that, eventually, never comes to a halt. On the other 
hand, new or improved capabilities open up the possibility of setting new goals. Actions 
intended for achieving these goals may also imply the appearance of new capabilities or 
modifications in previously existing ones. It is partly through the development of 
capabilities that dreams or desires may turn into goals: capabilities can activate 
intention.  
 
4.2. The performance of an SI  
Based on the endogenous dynamism proposed in this paper (the feedback process 
between agents’ intentionality and their evolving capabilities), the overall function of an 
SI may be examined from an abstract system perspective. We may examine how the 
different parts (elements) of the SI are connected (if they are indeed connected), the 
volume, intensity and character of the interactions, their continuity and the progressive 
implication of more agents, which agents are more (less) dynamic, the goals they pursue 
and if they are compatible a priori, etc. In this approach, the process of dynamic 
sequences of connections between the means/actions and goals established by the agents 
that interact within an SI, which produces new action plans, may be judged in terms of 
the adequacy of connections.  
Roughly speaking, we may assert that connections between means/actions and 
goals are adequate if they allow the projected actions and the deployment of means to 
produce the pursued goals. In other words, connections between means/actions and 
goals are adequate when intentions (which activate and change as new goals are 
formulated) give rise to actual facts as expected. Thus, there is evolutionary efficiency 
within an economic system when agents’ intentionality is being actualized 
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(“materialized”) through agents’ actions: because of the efficiency of the connections 
between means/actions and goals, intentions turn out to be actual facts in which goals 
are being produced.8 For example, within a given SI, scientists satisfy their aspirations 
of wisdom and (perhaps) social recognition; ‘capitalists’ or venture capital firms 
achieve a reasonable return, which is an incentive for investment; governments that 
fund (public) scientific research obtain a social (and perhaps political) return; users have 
better, safer and cheaper products and services at their disposal or a cleaner 
environment; enterprise and public organizations achieve their social goals, etc. In short, 
the fulfillment of the different agents’ goals and the compatibility (coordination) of their 
plans and expectations (Hayek, 1937, p.37), etc. strengthen the (new) connections 
within the system. This entire means that the characteristic pattern of innovation of the 
system is efficient.9  
The efficiency criterion we propose here is an evolutionary criterion because it is 
based on the continuous feedback process that goes from intention to actions and vice 
versa that is at the basis of the self-transformation (evolution) of agents’ action spaces. 
This self-transforming process of a system, of its elements and connections, is what 
makes it an evolving complex system.10 This intentional pursuit of goals by agents 
causes new capabilities and new patterns of behavior to be developed and learning 
processes to be activated, giving rise to new actions (and interactions) and new ways of 
doing things (process innovations) and so on, in a co-evolutionary process.11  
The purpose of this criterion is not to fix an external register of the elements, 
products and functionalities (e.g. determined by an external policy evaluator) to then 
measure and compare the performance of the system relative to the said external metric. 
Thus, the criterion proposed here and applied to an SI ‘measures’ by the own 
development (performance) of the SI because it is relative to the goals, intentions and 
expectations of the agents involved in that particular SI.  
                                            
8 Agents’ actions are both effective and efficient using Barnard’s (1938) terminology.  
9 We should also consider the ‘institutional return’ of an SI: how the institutional environment emerges, 
adapts and transforms and how this affects the compatibility of the agents’ goals (‘coordination’) within 
an SI. See Nelson (2008b) and Hodgson (2004).  
10 Note that a simple harmonic motion is dynamic but does not evolve -there is no room for self-
transformation.  
11 An example of the role of designing and implementing policy goals (and targeting) and its 
consequences in terms of infant industries development and cluster formation is Avnimelech and Teubal 
(2008).  
 
 
15
In terms of this criterion the performance of an SI is high if the connections 
within that system are adequate insofar as they cause the achievement of the pursued 
goals; if this is the case, we say that the SI is evolutionary efficient. By contrary, low SI 
performance would be the result of inadequate connections that do not lead to the 
achievement of the pursued goals; this is the case of an inefficient evolutionary system. 
Consider the next example. Let us take an action plan of an organization - the 
publication policy of a research institute of medical sciences, for example - whose main 
aim is to increase the prestige of that institution by means of reaching a prominent 
position in international medical publication rankings. Let G1 be that goal. If G1 were 
the main goal pursued, then the remaining means/actions and goals in the research 
institute’s action plan should lead to and be consequent with this goal. The organization 
action plan is efficient/inefficient a priori depending on the orderings of means/actions 
aimed at achieving this goal. At the same time, this depends on the absence/presence of 
logical contradictions or impossibilities among the actions/means to goals and of the 
absence/presence of conflicting goals. If these orderings mean that the organization is 
capable of triggering to reach a sufficient aspirational level of satisfaction regarding its 
main goal, we could say that the connections between means/actions to goals and other 
goals are efficient (from the point of view of the acting agent).  
Now let us suppose that the research institute proposes a second goal, which 
may also operate as a means to increase its prestige: to strength its financial position. 
For doing so the institute provide its researchers with monetary incentives to do 
entrepreneurial activities such as fund raising. Let G2 be that new goal. This policy tries 
to give the researchers the possibility of reaching a certain extra level of income and 
tries to increase the quality of their scientific production. The (new) actions that are 
carried out may lead to the new proposed goal G2 being achieved and then we can say 
that the actions are efficient or that certain elements linked to G2 appear and prevent the 
fulfillment of the plan in which high quality research papers is the primary goal. What if 
the researchers do maintain the strict preference of their primary goal G1 over the new 
goal G2; and at the same time, do they allocate a growing number of hours in G2 related 
activities, in such a way that they could have no time enough to produce high quality 
research papers? When the researchers devote a growing number of hours each day to 
complementary activities (such as meetings with venture capital firms, doing business 
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plans, etc.) and, at the same time, they maintain the hierarchy of the main goal G1 over 
the new goal G2, then they are formulating internally inconsistent plans –giving rise to 
inefficient action.  
Does this mean that all agents have to achieve their goals for the SI to perform 
well? What if the SI supports the fulfillment of the goals of some agents, but blocks that 
of other agents’ goals? What if one agent’s goal is to block the development of the SI? 
What if some agents’ goals are unrealistic? In our example, the researchers pursuing 
entrepreneurial activities (linked to G2) are intrinsically denying the possibility of 
reaching their main goal G1 - high quality papers - which is a flagrant paradox. All this 
results in an internal inconsistency of action plans that produces a rationing of goal 
satisfaction - generating a worsening of the efficiency of the agents’ actions. Thus a 
system (individuals, organization, etc.) as a whole may produce a lower performance in 
terms of the pursued goals.12  
How can inefficiency be lowered? There are different options for removing the 
source of action-rationing13 within such a system: agents may lower their expectations 
(reviewing and, eventually, removing some of their goals); adjust their actions/means to 
the rationing; review the content and/or hierarchy of the goals of their action plans; 
abandon some of their goals; change the institutional setting; and, perhaps introducing 
innovations. (In our example above by means of promoting sabbatical years, recruiting 
specialized personnel for fund raising activities, etc.)  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
No theoretical analysis should be made without a careful observation of reality: it is a 
matter of fact that agents plan their actions. Otherwise, agents’ action will be irrational 
or absolutely erratic (Nelson, 2006). The analysis of the interactive deployment of 
agents’ action and its products provides a useful framework for exploring the nature, 
properties, dynamics and complexity of connections within economic systems. Thus, 
                                            
12 Geels (2004) has explored the origin and consequences of these kinds of tensions and mismatches in 
goals, interests, etc. in a more specific context.  
13 These kinds of situations are common in economic theory and have been modelled, for example, in the 
Keynesian theory of effective demand, the macroeconomic models of rationed equilibria, where agents do 
not change their plans but rather ration them (see Benassy, 1986), etc.  
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the dynamic action of the agents that interact within a system should be explained under 
the categories of intentionality (Searle, 2001). Otherwise it is almost impossible to 
explain the products (commodities, technologies, structures, systems, etc.) and 
categories (value, prices, causality, etc.) of action (Mises, 1949) unless as self-
referenced explanations -which are not explanations by means of micro-foundations.  
In this paper, we have proposed a (micro-)foundation of SI dynamics based on 
agents’ intended action. The goal dynamics of agents within an SI, their intentions, 
capabilities, and action plans interacting within that system, are key elements to explain 
the dynamic performance of such a system. If our argument is accepted, substantial 
differences in SI’s performance -apart from the differences in the underlying 
technologies, institutions, etc.- are due to the goal dynamics and intentionality deployed 
by agents interacting within those systems. This is particularly clear when we consider 
the evolutionary efficiency criterion proposed in this paper. Agents pursuing their goals 
may or may not reach them. If only some agents reach their goals, the SI performance 
would imply that some agents’ goals would be blocked or rationed. This result may be a 
consequence of the activities of a prominent agent (e.g.: a monopoly) or coalition (an 
oligopoly) within the system; of some agents’ goals being unrealistic; of deficient 
connections with other economic subsystems (e.g.: with the financial sector); etc. In 
these cases, how can the inefficiency be of an SI lowered? There are different options 
for removing the source of rationing within such a system: agents may lower their 
expectations (reviewing and, eventually, removing some of their goals); adjust their 
actions/means to the (perceived) rationing environment; review the content and/or 
hierarchy of the goals of their action plans; abandon some of their goals; change the 
institutional setting; and, perhaps introducing technical or organizational innovations. In 
any case, policy makers should take into account this variety of circumstances when 
they try to improve the performance of an SI: which, how and why actors within an SI 
do have these and no others goals and how do they articulate and deploy their actions in 
order to reach them and their consequences in terms of capabilities and its dynamic 
implications are relevant issues for innovation policy.  
Of course, further research on these topics is needed, and a research agenda 
should include not only the integration of the literature on economic systems in general, 
and of systems of innovation in particular, with an economic theory of action, but 
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perhaps also with cognitive sciences, management and strategic literature, among 
others. Otherwise, the risk of the literature on systems of innovation to be considered at 
best a heuristic, rather than a theory, will remain.  
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